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ABSTRACT
Conviviality has been introduced as a social science con-
cept for multiagent systems to highlight soft qualitative re-
quirements like user friendliness of systems. In this pa-
per we introduce formal conviviality measures for depen-
dence networks using a coalitional game theoretic frame-
work, which we contrast with more traditional efficiency and
stability measures. Roughly, more opportunities to work
with other people increases the conviviality, whereas larger
coalitions may decrease the efficiency or stability of these
involved coalitions. We first introduce assumptions and re-
quirements, then we introduce a classification, and finally
we introduce the conviviality measures. We use a running
example from robotics to illustrate the measures.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Artificial Intelligence]: Distributed Artificial In-
telligence —Multiagent Systems
General Terms
Theory, Measurement, Human Factors
Keywords
Agent Societies and Societal Issues, Artificial Social Sys-
tems, Dependence Networks
1. INTRODUCTION
Computer systems have to be user friendly and convivial,
a concept from the social sciences defined by Illich as “in-
dividual freedom realized in personal interdependence” [10].
Multiagent systems technology can be used to realize tools
for conviviality when we interpret “freedom” as choice [5].
For example, if there is only one supply store in your build-
ing, then you depend on it for your supplies, but if there are
several stores, then you do not depend on a single store. We
say that there is more choice, and thus it is more convivial.
The challenge of measuring conviviality breaks down into
the following research questions:
1. How to define conviviality measures?
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2. How to classify conviviality?
3. What are the assumptions and requirements?
4. Why do we need a new measure?
5. How to use the measures in multiagent systems?
We measure conviviality by counting the possible ways to
cooperate, indicating degree of choice or freedom to engage
in coalitions. Our coalitional theory is based on dependence
networks [6, 19], labeled directed graphs where the nodes
are agents, and each labeled edge represents that the former
agent depends on the latter one to achieve some goal.
To explain the need for the conviviality measures, we show
the difference with stability and efficiency measures. Tools
for conviviality are concerned in particular with dynamic as-
pects of conviviality, such as the emergence of conviviality
from the sharing of properties or behaviors whereby each
member’s perception is that their personal needs are taken
care of [10]. In such dynamic circumstances, the stability
of the coalitions is an important criterion. Moreover, tradi-
tional coalition formation and game theoretic methods have
been focused on the efficiency of coalitions.
The focus on dependence networks and more specifically
on their cycles, is a reasonable way of formalizing convivi-
ality as something related to the freedom of choice of in-
dividuals plus the subsidiary relations –interdependence for
task achievement– among fellow members of a social sys-
tem. However, this freedom of choice view is not the only
view of conviviality, not even the most pertinent one. For
example, in earlier work we define conviviality masks based
on Taylor’s idea that conviviality “masks the power rela-
tionships and social structures that govern societies.” [20] A
conviviality mask is a transformation of social dependencies
by hiding power relations and social structures to facilitate
social interactions, and conviviality mask measures can be
defined to measure these transformations.
In this paper we do not consider Polanyi’s notion of em-
pathy, which needs trust, shared commitments and mutual
efforts to build up and maintain conviviality, or the many
definitions and relations with other social concepts discussed
in the conviviality literature, referring to qualities such as
trust, privacy and community identity.
The layout of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we
introduce a running example from coalition formation in
robotics, in Section 3 we discuss stability and efficiency mea-
sures for dependence networks, in Section 4 we discuss the
assumptions and requirements of conviviality measures, in
Section 5 we introduce a conviviality classification, and in
Section 6 we introduce the conviviality measures.
2. RUNNING EXAMPLE: NAO ROBOTS
We shall now give a scenario where we can discuss how
our system works. In an office building, there are assistant
robots to human being workers. The workers need office
materials, which are scare and are to be shared, in order to
accomplish their jobs. A worker may need materials which
are not currently available at their desks, e.g., someone else
in the building is using it. It is considered waste of time and
unproductive for a worker to ring everyone else to find out
where the needed materials are and leave his desk to collect
those materials himself. Instead, the worker can submit a
request to the robots to get and/or deliver the needed ma-
terials for him while he can continue with other works at his
desk. We shall refer to a request submitted to the robots as
a main task, which can be split into a number of tasks.
The communication between the workers and the robots
can be done via a simple web-based application, which will
transmit the request of the worker to the robots as well
as keeping track of their status. However, the robots have
limited computational resources. They only keep track of
what they have done recently. They rely on each other to
provide information about finding the location of a material.
Basically, the last robot which dealt with it will know. We
assume the existence of such an application as well as the
communication network is stable and reliable. In general,
the robots then travel from place to place during the working
hours. A depiction of this scenario is presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1: A depicted scenario of robots in office building.
In our example here, we assume that there is a set of 4
Nao robots, N = {n1, n2, n3, n4} and there are two main
tasks: TA = {t1, t2} and TB = {t3, t4}, where t1 is to deliver
a pen to desk A, t2 is to deliver a piece of paper to desk A,
t3 is to deliver a tube of glue to desk B, and t4 is to deliver
a cutter to desk B. Note that executing a task involves de-
tailed actions, such as grabbing and dropping the pen, which
are beyond the scope of this paper. These tasks are given
to robots, which need to complete them in minimal use of
power. Therefore, they need to minimize their travel time.
A robot has incentives to perform as many tasks as possible
as well as to save its battery life. 1.
Upon receiving the tasks, robots need to form coalitions
to finish them. Due to limited resources in the robots, not
all of the robots know about the tasks. There are mul-
1This is common for goal-oriented agents. However, the
model can also be applicable to other types of agents.
tiple steps to carry out all the tasks from start to finish.
First, the information known by each robot is who has the
information about the sources and the destinations of the
resources needed to accomplish the tasks. The actual coor-
dinates, involving the present location of each material and
the respective desk, are revealed only after an agreement on
a coalition among the robots has been made. This involves
interdependency among robots. Second, robots need to de-
cide how they form coalitions, i.e., which ones will join to
carry out each main task. Third, for each possible coalition,
each robot needs to plan for their optimal route to carry out
the assigned task.
At the start, robots get the information concerning the
material locations and the distances between the materials
and destinations. For example, robot n1, regarding task t1,
knows i) nothing about the source of the pen, i.e., where it
currently is, and ii) the destination of the pen, i.e., where
it must be delivered. Regarding task t2, robot n1 knows
where the paper is but knows nothing about its destination.
Table 1 presents the knowledge of the robots about the tasks
and the current distances among the robots, the materials
and the destinations.
Table 1: Robots’ knowledge (top); Distances (bottom).
Robot n1 n2
Task t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4
Source X X
Destination X X X
Robot n3 n4
Task t1 t2 t3 t4 t1 t2 t3 t4
Source X X
Destination X
Distances among locations
Robot Pen Paper Glue Cutter
n1 10 15 9 12
n2 14 8 11 13
n3 12 14 10 7
n4 9 12 15 11
Destination Pen Paper Glue Cutter
Desk A 11 16 9 8
Desk B 14 7 12 9
Upon receiving information about the tasks, robots form
coalitions to execute them. We refer to a coalition as a
group of robots executing a main task, i.e., either TA or TB .
Robots joining the coalition are to execute the task, e.g.,
deliver the pen to desk A. For example to accomplish all the
tasks t1, t2, t3, t4, the following coalitions may be formed:
C0 : {(n1, t3), (n2, t2), (n3, t4), (n4, t1)}, C1 : {(n1, t1),
(n2, t2), (n3, t3), (n4, t4)} and C2 : {(n1, t3), (n2, t4), (n3, t2)
(n4, t1)}. For agents to execute their tasks, they need to
know an optimal plan such that they can minimize their
costs for executing the task. Given the knowledge, they
are capable of computing for an optimal route for getting
the assigned materials and for delivering it2. Therefore, the
robots can generate plans for themselves after they have
been given tasks. However, discussing the details about gen-
erating plans for the robots is out of the scope of this paper.
2Planning for an optimal route is a typical shortest path
finding algorithm, whose implementations are available and
can be deployed on the robots.
3. EFFICIENCY AND STABILITY
3.1 Definitions
There are many ways to define efficiency. Generally speak-
ing, efficiency in a coalition is a relation between what agents
can achieve as part of the organization compared to what
they can do alone or in different coalitions. In this section
and to give an illustration on our example, we recall two
definitions of efficiency: the cost efficiency (Def. 3.1), and
the economic efficiency (Def. 3.2).
Definition 3.1 (Cost Efficiency). Let the set of ag-
ents N = {n1, . . . , nj}, T be the set of tasks (or goals),
and C ⊆ N a coalition. Let Cost : 2N → R be the func-
tion that associates to a coalition the cost of achieving all
tasks of T . Then, C is cost efficient if and only ∀ ni ∈ C,
(Cost(ni)− Cost(C)) > 0.
Definition 3.2 (Economic Efficiency). A coalition
is economically efficient iff i) no one can be made better
off without making someone else worse off, ii) no additional
output can be obtained without increasing the amount of in-
puts, iii) production proceeds at the lowest possible per-unit
cost [14].
Stability of coalitions is related to the potential gain in
staying in the coalition or quitting the coalition for more
profit (i.e., free riding). Hence, several elements come to
play for the evaluation of a coalition’s stability.
First, the coalition outcome should be greater than the
individual ones cumulated. This is usually computed via a
characteristic function such as proposed by [13]. Therefore,
a necessary condition to stability is that the characteristic
function is positive, i.e., acting as a group is overall more
beneficial than acting individually.
Second, the distribution of benefits should be fair. Sev-
eral functions, named sharing rules where proposed such as
Shapley value [16], nucleolus [15], and Satisfactory Nucleolus
[12]. The leading idea is to take the individual contribution
and the free rider’s value into account when sharing the ben-
efits.
For the purpose of illustration, we introduce the concept
of core to check the stability of a coalition. Indeed, it is
relatively (computably) simple to check if a coalition is in the
core. Informally, a coalition is in the core iff no sub-coalition
is more profitable. Formally, the core follows Def. 3.3.
Definition 3.3 (Core). Let x ∈ RN be a pay-off al-
location vector, ν : 2N → R be the characteristic function
(pay-off function), and C ⊆ N a coalition. Then, x is in the
core iff
∑
i∈N
xi = ν(N) and
∑
i∈C
xi ≥ ν(C).
3.2 Efficiency computation
Let us apply the above definitions to our example. From
Table 1 of Sect. 2 we can compute the distance for each
robot to do each task, as displayed on Table 2:
Using this table we can compute the cost of executing
tasks in a given coalition by adding up the costs of each robot
to the assigned task. For instance, the cost of C1 : {(n1, t1),
(n2, t2), (n3, t3), (n4, t4)} is Cost(C1) = 87, whereas the cost
of C2 : {(n1, t3), (n2, t4), (n3, t2) (n4, t1)} is Cost(C2) = 93,
and the cost of C3 : {(n1, t1), (n1, t3), (n2, t2), (n4, t4)} is
Cost(C3) = 86.
Table 2: Distances between robots and their tasks.
t1 t2 t3 t4
n1 10+11=21 15+16=31 9+12=21 12+9=21
n2 14+11=25 8+16=24 11+12=23 13+9=22
n3 12+11=23 14+16=30 10+12=22 7+9=16
n4 9+11=20 12+16=28 15+12=27 11+9=20
These costs have to be compared to the costs of each robot
doing all tasks on their own, which are respectively 94 for
n1 and n2, 91 for n3, and 95 for n4. As a conclusion, we can
say that C1 and C3 seem efficient for all robots, whereas C2
is a bad option with respect to efficiency for n3 only.
We can see that C3 is more cost efficient than C1. How-
ever, we should note that C1 is not economically efficient.
Indeed, there is a coalition C0 : {(n1, t3), (n2, t2), (n3, t4),
(n4, t1)} where at least one agent is better off without mak-
ing anyone worse off (actually, this applies for all of them),
all the rest been equal. If we compare Cost(C0) = 81 to
Cost(C3) = 86, we conclude that C0 is economically effi-
cient and more cost efficient than C3.
3.3 Stability computation
As explained earlier, we will check the stability of the
coalitions according to the core definition (Def. 3.3).
We can see that C1 is not in the core, hence not stable,
because there exist at least a sub-coalition which is more
profitable, e.g., C3. Indeed, in the context of C1 the robot n1
can threaten n3 to do the task t3 for the same outcome but
less cost. The two other robots agree since their respective
pay-off is unchanged. The coalition C2 is also not in the
core, since n2 can be threatened by all agents and n3 can be
threatened by n2 and n4.
In contrast, C3 and C0 are in the core. In fact, in C3,
even if n4 has a lower cost than n1 for the task t1, neither
n2 nor n4 can handle the task t3 without decreasing their
global pay-off, i.e., they are satisfied with this coalition.
The coalition C0 is stable, according to the core defini-
tion, and it also involves all the robots, whereas C3 leaves
one robot idle (n3) and gives additional work to another one
(n1). As a preliminary conclusion, for efficiency and stabil-
ity, as well as for the sake of balancing the workload (which
was also an objective of the main goal achievement), the
coalition C0 seems to be the best.
3.4 Need for other coalition measures
Efficiency and stability metrics are commonly used to
evaluate coalitions. The former giving an assurance on the
economical gain reached by being in the coalition, the later
giving a certainty that the coalition is viable on the long
term. Therefore, the positive evaluation of a coalition against
these two metrics is often considered to be a prerequisite for
the coalition formation.
However, depending on the application domain, other func-
tional and non-functional requirements, e.g., security, user-
friendliness or conviviality, may play an important role in
the choice of a coalition. Requirements may be considered
in a trade-off at the same level as efficiency and stability,
or as a further filtering criterion, to select among otherwise
efficient and stable coalitions. This highlights the need for
further metrics, such as the proposed conviviality metrics.
4. ASSUMPTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS
According to [3], conviviality may be measured by the
number of reciprocity based coalitions that can be formed.
Some coalitions, however, provide more opportunities for
their participants to cooperate with each other than others,
being thereby more convivial. To represent the interdepen-
dencies among agents in the coalitions, we use dependence
networks. First, we present definition 4.1 [3], illustrated with
our running example. Then, we review our assumptions and
requirements for the conviviality measures we define.
Recalling Section 2, two steps are needed to achieve each
task. To each step, we associate a goal for a robot to reach.
For example, to perform task t1, deliver pen to desk A,
robots must have the goals g1S , get the pen from its source,
and g1D deliver it to its destination. Abstracting from tasks
and plans we define a dependence network as in 4.1 [3]:
Definition 4.1 (Dependence networks). A depen-
dence network is a tuple 〈A,G, dep,≥〉 where: A is a set
of agents, G is a set of goals, dep : A × A → 2G is a
function that relates with each pair of agents, the sets of
goals on which the first agent depends on the second, and
≥: A → 2G × 2G is for each agent a total pre-order on sets
of goals occurring in his dependencies: G1 >(a) G2.
In our example Section 3, robots form the coalitions C0, C1
and C2. Let DN0, DN1 and DN2, visualized in Figure 2
(a), (b) and (c), be three dependence networks respectively
corresponding to these coalitions, where:
Nao robots N = {n1, n2, n3, n4},
Goals G = {g1S , g1D, g2S , g2D, g3S , g3D, g4S , g4D},
where dependencies are built from Table 1 and preferences
are the following:
• for DN0: dep(n1, n4) = {g3S}, dep(n2, n1) = {g2S},
dep(n2, n3) = {g2D}, dep(n3, n2) = {g4D},
dep(n4, n1) = {g1D}, dep(n4, n2) = {g1S};
Robot n4 prefers to deliver pen to desk A than to get
it : {g1D} >(n2) {g1S};
• for DN1: dep(n1, n2) = {g1S}, dep(n2, n1) = {g2S},
dep(n2, n3) = {g2D}, dep(n3, n4) = {g3S},
dep(n3, n1) = {g3D}, dep(n4, n3) = {g4S},
dep(n4, n2) = {g4D};
Robot n4 prefers to get cutter than deliver it to desk
B: {g4S} >(n2) {g4D}, and n3 prefers to get glue than
deliver it to desk B: {g3S} >(n1) {g3D};
• for DN2: dep(n2, n3) = {g4S}, dep(n1, n4) = {g3S},
dep(n3, n1) = {g2S}, dep(n4, n1) = {g1D},
dep(n4, n2) = {g3S};
Robot n3 prefers to deliver pen to desk A than get
glue: {g1D} >(n2) {g3S}.
4.1 Assumptions
In this work, the cycles identified in a dependence net-
work are considered as coalitions. These coalitions are used
to evaluate conviviality in the network. Cycles denote the
smallest graph topology expressing interdependence, i.e, con-
viviality, and are considered as atomic relations conveying
interdependence. When referring to cycles, we are implicitly
signifying simple cycles (as defined in [7]), also discarding
self-loops. Moreover, when referring to conviviality, we al-
ways refer to potential interaction not actual interaction.
In our second assumption, we consider the conviviality of a
dependence network to be evaluated in a bounded domain,
i.e., over a [min;max] interval. This allows to read the
values obtained by any evaluation method.
4.2 Requirements
The first requirement for our conviviality measures con-
cerns the size of coalitions. This requirement is captured
by the statement that larger coalitions are more convivial
than smaller ones. We express this requirement through the
following two cases. First case, a dependence network DNi
with a coalition of size n is better for conviviality than a
DNj with coalition of size m = (n−α), where m < n. For
example, consider a coalition for peace in the world. The
more countries participate, the better it is. Second case, a
dependence network DNi with a coalition of size n is bet-
ter for conviviality than a dependence network DNj with
two coalitions, one of size k and the other of size l, such as
that k+ l ≤ n, all else being equal. This is motivated by the
fact that having one large coalition eliminates the risk of be-
ing exposed to potential competition from other coalitions,
which may be looking for the same resources.
Our second requirement concerns the number of coali-
tions. It is captured by the statement that the more coali-
tions in the dependence network, the higher the conviviality
measure (all else being equal). This requirement is moti-
vated by the fact that a large number of coalitions indicates
more interactions among agents, which is positive in term
of conviviality according to our definition based on interde-
pendence.
Figure 2: Dependence networks DN0, DN1 and DN2.
5. CONVIVIALITY CLASSIFICATION
Based on the requirements outlined in Section 4, we now
propose a conviviality classification that allows an intuitive
grasp of conviviality measures through a ranking of the de-
pendence networks. First, we introduce the five definitions
of conviviality classes, from the absolute best to the absolute
worst convivial networks.
5.1 Definitions
Definition 5.1 (P). A dependence network DN is P
convivial (most convivial), iff all agents in DN belong to all
cycles, i.e., ∀ai ∈ A and ∀ck ∈ C, ai is s.t. ai ∈ ck, where
C = {c1, . . . , cl} is the set of all cycles.
Definition 5.2 (APE). A dependence network DN is
APE convivial, iff all agents in DN belong to at least one
cycle, i.e., ∀ai ∈ A,∃ck /∈ C, s.t. ai ∈ ck, where C =
{c1, . . . , cl} is the set of all cycles.
Definition 5.3 (N). A dependence network DN is N
convivial, iff there exists at least one cycle in DN , and there
is at least one agent not in a cycle, i.e., ∃a, b ∈ A s.t. a, b ∈
ck, where ck /∈ C, and ∃d ∈ A s.t. d /∈ ci, ∀ci ∈ C, where
C = {c1, . . . , cl} is the set of all cycles.
Definition 5.4 (AWE). A dependence network DN is
AWE convivial, iff there is no cycle in DN , i.e., C = {∅},
and s.t. ∃dep(a, b) = {gi}, where a, b ∈ A and gi ∈ G.
Definition 5.5 (W). A dependence network DN is W
convivial (worst convivial), iff there is no dependency be-
tween the agents in DN , i.e., @dep(a, b) = {gi}, where a, b ∈
A and gi ∈ G.
Figure 3, illustrates the different types of dependence net-
works that correspond to each conviviality class. The arrow
on the top of the figure depicts the direction of increasing
conviviality. The scale goes from the worst case (no convivi-
ality) to the best case (maximal conviviality).
5.2 Examples
Consider the three dependence networks DN0, DN1, and
DN2 respectively corresponding to robots coalitions C0, C1,
and C2 illustrated Figure 2. All robots belong to at least
one cycle. Hence, from Definition 5.2, C0, C1, and C2 be-
long to the APE conviviality class. They are said to be
Almost Perfectly convivial. All robots are engaged in recip-
rocal dependence relations: each one gives to the coalition
and receives from it. All robots are pursuing goals and co-
operate with at least one other robot to achieve their tasks.
With a different initial knowledge, the potential coalitions
formed may belong to other conviviality classes. For in-
stance, if in the initial knowledge table, the destination of
task t2 is known by n4 instead of n3, then coalition C01 is
represented by the dependence network DN01 depicted on
Figure 4. We note that n3 depends on another robot (n2),
but that this dependency is not reciprocated, leaving n3 out
of any coalition. Hence, n3 being isolated, the corresponding
coalition belongs to the N conviviality class.
n1 n2
n3n4
g3S
g2S
g2D
g4Dg1D
g1S
Figure 4: Conviviality class N .
Consider now that in C1, each robot knows the informa-
tion, i.e., source and destination, about one task only, and
is assigned the task it knows about. Then, not a single
robot depends on another, since each robot knows exactly
what to do on its own. There is no cooperation among the
robots, each is isolated. The corresponding network consists
of four nodes and no dependencies. Therefore, this coalition
belongs to the W conviviality class. Similarly, if all robots
know all the information about all tasks, then any task as-
signment results in a coalition corresponding to a network
of conviviality class W , as all robots may perform any task
by themselves without having to cooperate with any other
robots to obtain the information concerning the source and
destination of the office supplies they have to move.
5.3 Preliminary distinctions among measures
Returning to the efficiency and stability measures pre-
sented in Section 3, we can already see a major distinction
between conviviality and the two former metrics. Indeed, in
order to evaluate conviviality, we need to perform an anal-
ysis of the dependencies between the agents, i.e., we must
consider the topological aspects of the task (or goal) de-
pendencies in the graph. This is not the case in efficiency
and stability metrics, which only compare coalitions to sub-
coalitions or individuals in terms of global pay-off. There-
fore, we cannot rely on similar functions to evaluate con-
viviality. Finally, conviviality is orthogonal to efficiency and
stability, and trade-off situations are to be expected.
a b
cd
W
a b
cd
AWe
a b
cd
N
a b
cd
APe
a b
c d
P
CONVIVIALITY
Figure 3: Conviviality classes.
6. CONVIVIALITY MEASURES
We now propose two indices based on graph properties
and built on three measures; the number of: agents in the
network, agents that belong to at least one cycle, and cycles.
We define the in-the-loop index ρDNi as the ratio of the
number of agents in cycles in relation to the total number of
agents in the network. For example, computing the in-the-
loop index for coalitions C0 and C01, respectively represented
by DN0 depicted Figure 3a and DN01 depicted Figure 4
yields: ρDN0 = 1 and ρDN0 = 0.75. Although useful this
metric and its inverse (β = 1−ρ) do not allow to differentiate
between the number of coalitions present in the network,
e.g., we obtain the same value for the networks depicted
Figure 3a, 3b and 3c: ρDN0 = ρDN1 = ρDN2 = 1.
We therefore set a second index, the connectivity index
δDNi , defined as the average length of cycles in the network,
and reflecting when coalitions are larger, i.e. more convivial.
Computing the connectivity index for coalitions C0, C01, C1
and C2 we obtain: δDN0 = 1.333 and δDN01 = 1, δDN1 = 1
and δDN2 = 2. Clearly, this result satisfies the requirement
of Section 4 that the larger the cycle, the more convivial the
network, all else being equal, however, it fails to distinguish
between DN01 and DN1 even though DN1 contains more
cycles. Moreover, intuitively, and per our classification Sec-
tion 5, DN01 containing one isolated node is less convivial
than DN1, in which each node belongs to at least one cycle.
Combining the two indices, as well as defining other mea-
sures based on global graph properties, does not seem to
create more accurate measures, i.e., satisfying our require-
ments, hence highlighting the need to capture the network
topologies more precisely.
Therefore, we propose a conviviality measure constructed
on our assumption Section 4 that conviviality measures are
based on the coalitions the agents form with each other.
As at least two agents are needed to form a coalition, the
measure is based on pairs of agents. More specifically, what
is measured is the number of coalitions to which any two
given agents in the dependence network belong, the evalua-
tion being performed over the whole network. Furthermore,
to allow comparisons between dependence networks of var-
ious sizes and to increase its usefulness, the measure must
be defined over a bounded space, such as [0; 1].
6.1 Bounding evaluations
Our first step is to define a function that evaluates convivi-
ality over one pair of agents – denoting a partial measure of
conviviality. Let coalDNi(a, b) ∈ N, be the number of cy-
cles that contain both a and b in a dependence network
DNi, where a, b ∈ A and a 6= b. Then, based on coal(a, b),
we construct a bounded conviviality measure. We start by
determining the maximum number of cycles that contain
any two agents. We note that the number of cycles con-
taining two agents, coal(a, b), can neither be more than the
maximum number of cycles possible containing two (given)
agents nor less than no cycle at all. Let Θ be the maximum
number of cycles between two agents, we write:
0 ≤ coal(a, b) ≤ Θ (1)
In order to determine the maximum number of cycles, let
us first assume that the set of goals is reduced to only one
goal, i.e., |G| = 1, and the DN is a clique on all goals. We
note that the maximal number of cycles is the summation of
the maximal number of cycles for each cycle length. We call
L the cycle length. In addition, as stated in Section 4, we
do not consider self-loops in the evaluation. So, the smallest
cycle to consider is L = 2, and that can happen iff the set
of agents A has a cardinality greater than or equal to 2, i.e.,
|A| ≥ 2. Trivially, when |G| = 1 there can be at most 1
cycle between two agents such that L = 2.
To have a cycle of length L = 3, we must have at least 3
agents in the DN, i.e., |A| = 3. We can already generalize,
saying that the maximal cycle length L in a DN with |A|
number of agents is L = |A|.
Furthermore, given two agents a, b ∈ A, a 6= b, a cycle of
length L = 3 is found if there is a agent c ∈ A, c 6= a, c 6= b
such that there is an edge from a (resp. b) to c and an
edge from c to b (resp. a). The maximum number of cycle
of length L = 3 is then obtained by choosing one agent c
among the agents which are neither a nor b, without repeti-
tion and with order. Since there are |A|−2 such c agents, the
maximal number of cycle of length L = 3 can be expressed
by the permutation P (|A|− 2, 1), where P (n, k) is the usual
permutation defined in combinatorics by: P (n, k) = n!
(n−k)! ,
where n is the number of elements available for selection and
k is the number of elements to be selected (0 ≤ k ≤ n)
For length L ≥ 3, applying a similar reasoning, we obtain
the maximal number of cycles of length L by choosing L−2
agents among |A| − 2, without repetition and with order,
hence given by the expression P (|A| − 2, L− 2).
Finally, as noted above, the maximum number of cycles
is the summation of the maximal number of cycles for each
cycle length. Hence for |G| = 1, the maximum number of
cycles, Θ|G|=1, is:
Θ|G|=1 =
L=|A|∑
L=2
P (|A| − 2, L− 2) (2)
Now, for |G| ≥ 1, we can choose for each edge one goal
among |G|. Since the number of edges for a cycle is de-
fined by its length L, we have a maximum of |G|L cycles of
length L. Therefore, the maximum number of cycles, Θ, is
expressed as follows:
Θ =
L=|A|∑
L=2
P (|A| − 2, L− 2)× |G|L (3)
6.2 Combining conviviality measures
In Equation 2 we obtain bounds for a pairwise evaluation.
We now need to sum up all these pairwise evaluations. Let∑
coal(a, b) be this summation. As there are |A|(|A| − 1)
pairs of agents to consider in the whole network:
0 ≤
∑
coal(a, b) ≤ |A|(|A| − 1)×Θ (4)
If we want to bound our conviviality measure conv over [0;1],
i.e., 0 ≤ conv ≤ 1, then we get the following Equation 5:
0 ≤
∑
coal(a, b)
A(A− 1)×Θ ≤ 1 (5)
We can now write Equation 6 to express the pairwise con-
viviality measure of a dependence network DN :
conv(DN) =
∑
coal(a, b)
Ω
(6)
where we write Ω = A(A−1)×Θ for the sake of readability,
for the remainder of the paper.
6.3 Conviviality computation
In Table 3, we present the conviviality evaluation for each
dependence network, illustrated in Figure 2. As expected,
the value for the maximum number of cycles is a large num-
ber, Ω = A(A− 1)×Θ = 111360. The evaluations are per-
formed using the pairwise measure defined in Equation 6.
The results return conv(DN1) = 0.000143 > conv(DN2) =
0.000125 > conv(DN0) = 0.0000897, indicating that DN1 is
the most convivial network, followed by DN2 and that DN0
is the least convivial.
We observe that conv(DN1) > conv(DN0), coincides with
our intuition as clearly, DN1 contains more cycles thanDN0.
This result satisfies our requirements Section 4 namely, that
the more coalitions in the dependence network, the higher
the conviviality measure (all else being equal). DN1 is more
convivial than DN0 as more cooperation may occur among
the robots in coalition C1. Similarly, the computation re-
turns conv(DN1) > conv(DN2) as DN1 contains more cy-
cles than DN2. The result conv(DN2) > conv(DN0) reflects
the fact that DN2 contains a cycle larger than the largest cy-
cle in DN0. In this grand coalition (n1, g3D, n4, g1S , n2,g4S ,
n3, g2S , n1), all four robots may cooperate. As per our re-
quirements Section 4, such a coalition is more convivial as
the potential conflicts that may arise among several smaller
coalitions is reduced.
Computing conv(DN01) returns, as expected, the smaller
value ( 8
Ω
= 0.0000718) highlighting the lesser conviviality of
coalition DN01.
In our running example, we measured conviviality by count-
ing the possible ways for robots to cooperate, indicating the
degree of choice or freedom to engage in coalitions. Indeed,
the conviviality measures allow to compare the coalitions
and select the most appropriate one(s) for the multiagent
system. If a high level of cooperation is needed in the system,
then coalitions involving the highest number of agents and
cycles will be preferred. Of course, trade-offs must be made
among the system requirements, including user-friendliness
and conviviality as well as efficiency and stability. How-
ever, the conviviality measures allow to provide an indicator
for the level of cooperation among the agents and their de-
gree of choice to engage in coalitions. More opportunities
to work together with other agents increases the convivial-
ity. As stated by Bradshaw et al. [11], the success of future
human-agent teams relies in such sophisticated interdepen-
dence among human-agent team members.
Table 3: Measures based on dependencies.
Fig. Pairs in 1 cycle Pairs in 2 cycles
Conviviality(
=
Σcoal(a,b)
Ω
)
DN0
(n1, n2), (n2, n1),
(n2, n3), (n2, n4),
(n3, n2), (n4, n2)
(n1, n4), (n4, n1)
6×1+2×2
Ω
= 10Ω
DN1
(n1, n3), (n2, n4),
(n3, n1), (n4, n2)
(n1, n2), (n2, n1),
(n2, n3), (n3, n2),
(n3, n4), (n4, n3)
4×1+6×2
Ω
= 16Ω
DN2
(n1, n2), (n1, n3),
(n2, n1), (n2, n3),
(n2, n4), (n3, n1),
(n3, n2), (n3, n4),
(n4, n2), (n4, n3)
(n1, n4), (n4, n1)
10×1+2×2
Ω
= 14Ω
7. RELATED RESEARCH
This paper builds on our previous work, Caire et al. [5] in
which, conviviality has been proposed as a social concept to
develop multi-agent systems. Indeed, the intuitions behind
the term conviviality are significant for social IT-enabled
systems, and has been very little studied so far. However,
conviviality is likely to become a core design feature for such
systems in the future.
In “Conviviality Measure for Early Requirement Phase”,
Caire and van der Torre [4] introduce three conviviality mod-
els using dependence networks. First, temporal dependence
networks model the evolution of dependence networks and
conviviality over time. Second, epistemic dependence net-
works combine the viewpoints of stakeholders, and third
normative dependence networks model the transformation
of social dependencies by hiding power relations and social
structures to facilitate social interactions. The authors show
how to use these visual languages in design. The descrip-
tion level of the paper is methodologies and languages, and
conviviality measures were not defined.
The approach we use in this paper brings novelty by op-
erationalizing an elusive intuition and proposing a way to
measure one type of conviviality. Furthermore, we provide
an original approach to measuring one aspect of robustness
of coalitions of agents. We present two kinds of measures: a
conviviality classification that captures a hierarchical struc-
ture of the dependence networks, and a pairwise measure,
based on the interdependencies among robots, that provide
a total order on conviviality dependence networks.
This work builds on the notion of social dependence in-
troduced by Castelfranchi along with concepts like groups
and collectives [6]. Castelfranchi brings such concepts from
social theory to agent theory to enrich agent theory and
develop experimental, conceptual and theoretical new in-
struments for social sciences . The present work takes as a
starting point an abstract notion of dependence graphs ini-
tially elaborated by Conte and Sichman [19]. The notions of
dependence graphs and dependence networks were further
developed by the authors [19], and with a more abstract
representation similar to ours, in Boella et al. [1] and Caire
et al. [5].
Dependence based coalition formation is analyzed by Sich-
man [18], while other approaches are developed in [17, 8, 2].
The clustering coefficient provides global and local mea-
sures in social networks to indicate respectively the overall
clustering of the network and the embeddedness of single
nodes. Although an interesting measure, the clustering co-
efficient was not used in our paper as it does not include the
notion of cycle fundamental to our conviviality model. The
literature concerning efficiency and stability in coalition is
vast and referred to in Section 3. Particularly relevant to
conviviality are the works related to the fairness of sharing
the benefits of coalitions as in [14, 16, 15, 12].
Similarly to Grossi and Turrini [9], our approach brings to-
gether coalitional theory and dependence theory in the study
of social cooperation within multiagent systems. However,
our approach differs as it does not hinge on agreements.
Finally, works emphasizing agents’ interdependence as a
critical feature of multiagent systems, particularly for the
design of systems involving joint interaction among human-
agent systems such as in Johnson and Bradshaw et al. “coac-
tive” design [11].
8. SUMMARY
Conviviality has been introduced as a social science con-
cept for multiagent systems to highlight soft qualitative re-
quirements like user friendliness of systems. In this paper we
introduce formal conviviality measures for dependence net-
works using a coalitional game theoretic framework, which
we contrast with more traditional efficiency and stability
measures. Roughly, more opportunities to work with other
people increases the conviviality.
We classify conviviality by five degrees of conviviality,
from most convivial or fully connected to least convivial
or unconnected. The assumptions of our conviviality mea-
sures are a bounded domain given by a [min; max] inter-
val, and coalitions are represented by simple cycles. The
requirements of our conviviality measures are that larger
coalitions are more convivial than smaller ones, that coali-
tions based on mutual dependence are more convivial than
coalitions based on reciprocal dependence, and that more
possible coalitions indicate a higher conviviality, all else be-
ing equal. We need a new measure, since more traditional
measures like efficiency or stability measures are different.
More opportunities to work with other people increases the
conviviality, whereas larger coalitions may decrease the effi-
ciency or stability of these involved coalitions. Conviviality
measures may be seen as a particular kind of robustness
measures, since more convivial systems have more opportu-
nities for agents to choose their partners, and therefore are
also more robust when partnerships break up. However, in
contrast to robustness measures, conviviality measures do
not say anything about the stability of the coalitions. Note
that intuitively, these measures may be related, for exam-
ple that more stable coalitions may be more convivial, but
in this paper we have disentangled these measures as much
as possible. We illustrate how to use the conviviality mea-
sures in multiagent systems by discussing an example from
robotics.
In further research we contemplate the need to come up
with different notions of conviviality when one wants to say
that a ”goal-directed” system is convivial (e.g., a G2C por-
tal) as opposed to when one claims that an ”open interaction
platform” is convivial (e.g., Facebook or LinkedIn). While in
the first case there is an owner of the system (the city gov-
ernment or the tax authority) that imposes a certain way
of doing things in order to reach some goals that may be
convivial or dictatorial, in the second place one may think
of functionalities that make the platform prone to a con-
viviality that is closer to the intuitions operationalized in
this paper (e.g. artifacts that facilitate bringing friends into
the platform and doing interesting things with them thanks
to the platform). We will also look into the ”conviviality
as mask” intuition where conviviality appears to be more
a matter of etiquette and discretion, than a matter of task
interdependence. We expect that the proposed measures do
not apply in a straightforward way, but that new measures
will be needed to capture further views of conviviality.
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